ABSTRAKSI
Penelitian ini didasarkan atas pengamatan awal penulisan teradap fenomena yang
terjadi ditengah-tengah masyarakat kita yang punya kepecayaan besar terhadap para
dukun, tenaga penyembuh alternative, paranormal dan dukun-dukun tabib, ditengah
majunya teknlogi kedokteran , masih banyak orang yang menyerahkan dirinya pada
pengobatan yang kadang kala tidak dapat diterima oleh akal sehat atau bahkan
besebrangan dengan konsep-konsep kesehatan secara umum.
Kalau kita mau berjalan mengelilingi kata yang luasnya tidak seberapa ini, pasti
akan kita dapati ratuan papan nama yang bertujuan menawarkan pengobatan alternative
maupun tradisional. Selain memasang papan ada juga yang mempromosikan
pengobatannya lewat media massa baik cetak maupun eletronik, sehingga dengan mudah
orang mengetahui keberadaan pengobatan tersebut. Diberbagai channel tv kini orang
dapat dengan mudah berkonsultasi dan minta diterawang penyakitnya, bahkan bias juga
diobati jarak jauh hanya dengan menempelkan telapak tangan ke layar kaca. Aneh
memang, tapi itulah kenyataan yang terjadi sekarang ini.
Selain itu para dukun banyak juga yang tidak memasang papan nama di depan
tempat prakteknya ata promosi lewat media massa. Keberadaan dukun ini bisanya cukup

In this paper, I discuss how there has been a recent trend in the philosophy of scientific explanation towards a pluralistic view that acknowledges the importance of both of the major accounts of explanation of the last thirty years- the unificationist account, as proposed in (Kitcher, 1989), and the causal account, primarily as described in (Cartwright, 1983), but with aspects from (Salmon, 1998)- and admits the possibility of other, as yet undiscovered, accounts. Although I believe that a pluralist position is essentially correct, I argue that no satisfactory description has been given of how one determines which explanatory contexts call for which kind of explanation. Limiting my analysis to the contemporary particle physics techniques associated with Effective Field Theories, which I believe offer a particularly good case study for distinguishing between contexts, I argue that the determination of explanatory type from context is a pragmatic issue. To address this issue, I turn to a third account of explanation,the pragmatic account, as described in (van Fraassen, 1980). Although I argue the pragmatic account fails as a full account of explanation, it succeeds, in modified form, in describing the pragmatics of explanation,specifically of the pluralist account. In the end, I argue that explanatory context in particle physics is determined by the relationship between the experimental context in which the person demanding the explanation is interested, and the characteristic energy scale of the phenomenon to be explained. When the experimental context in question overlaps with the characteristic scale of the phenomenon, a causal explanation is called for; if the experimental context is higher than the characteristic scale, then explanatory unification is called for.